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DCI/IC 78-2326

17 FEB 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[REDACTED]
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

SUBJECT: Talking and Backup Papers for Briefing of the Special
Coordination Committee on Counterintelligence

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski dated 9 February 1978,
Subject: SCC Meeting on Counterintelligence

1. Action Requested: None. Attached herewith for your review are a talking paper (Tab A) and a backup paper (Tab B) for use at the 24 February 1978 meeting of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) on Counterintelligence.

2. Discussion:

a. The attached papers cover the threat, doctrine and capabilities topics requested by reference. A chart to accompany these papers showing comparative Soviet and CIA intelligence officer deployment abroad will be provided next week.

b. The backup paper, with the additional graphics, could be distributed at the meeting if desired. It is an expansion of the talking paper.

c. The papers were prepared by [REDACTED] of my staff in close cooperation and coordination with the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, and were approved by [REDACTED], Chief of that Staff.

d. In accordance with the suggestion in reference, items for possible early discussion or action by the SCC will be provided for your consideration early next week, by which time the draft tasking memorandum cited in reference may be available from the National Security Council Staff.

Downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from classified
attachments

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SUBJECT: Talking and Backup Papers for Briefing of the Special
Coordination Committee on Counterintelligence

25X1 e. [] who is responsible for Community foreign
counterintelligence affairs on my staff, will be available to
accompany you to the SCC meeting.

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Attachments:

Tab A - Talking Paper

Tab B - Backup Paper

cc: DDCI
DDO
DDO/C/CI

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DCI/RMS/OPEI/PAID [] (17 Feb 78)

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II. DCI FCI Responsibilities

A. Community Responsibilities

- o DCI has budgetary responsibility for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), including the FCI resources of all agencies engaged in FCI activities.
- o DCI looks to the Special Coordination Committee/Counter intelligence (SCC/CI) for FCI policy guidance affecting administration of his NFIP responsibility.
- o DCI uses the staff of his Deputy for Resource Management to do Community FCI studies and assessments to promote FCI program effectiveness and review and evaluate NFIP budgets.

B. CIA Responsibilities

- o Conduct FCI activities outside the United States and coordinate FCI activities conducted outside the United States by other agencies within the Intelligence Community-- primarily the military FCI agencies, but also the FBI.

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- CIA field stations abroad do both. Final FCI coordination is at Headquarters by the CI Staff in the Operations Directorate.
- o Conduct FCI activities within the United States, not involving internal security functions, but only in coordination with the FBI and subject to the approval of the Attorney General.



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- o Produce and disseminate FCI studies and reports.
 - This is done by the CI Staff; its production elements have recently been substantially reduced in size but it is still the most important production office in the FCI community for national FCI studies.
- o Maintain as a service of common concern centralized indexes and repositories of FCI information on foreign intelligence and security agencies with respect to their organization,

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personnel and functioning (assigned by National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID 5 and DCID 5/3).)

- Although not explicitly so limited the central files and indices are concentrated on activities abroad and do not include equivalent detail on foreign intelligence and security service personnel and activities within the United States; principal holdings on that are by the FBI.

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III. CIA FCI Doctrine

- o General CIA FCI objective: Detection and neutralization abroad of foreign intelligence and security services to protect all United States interests.
- o All CIA FCI activity is centrally managed by CIA Headquarters with detailed field reporting to Headquarters required.



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- To protect CIA and other United States government activities from host country intelligence and security services.

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IV. CIA FCI Capabilities

- o CIA operational field capabilities are relatively unchanged despite ongoing Operations Directorate personnel reductions.



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- There is some loss of accrued FCI experience which may temporarily adversely affect field operations, but the high quality of personnel remaining should be able to make up for this in a reasonable time.

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- o The extent to which CIA capabilities meet United States FCI needs can best be discerned by a net national FCI assessment,

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yet to be done, encompassing the total hostile intelligence and security service threat--SIGINT and imagery, as well as HUMINT.

- Such an assessment, in addition to covering all aspects of the threat, may have to take into consideration the various protective security measures which limit the effectiveness of the threat--measures such as personnel, physical and document security systems which are not included in the E.O. 12036 definition of CI.
- o Production elements of the CI Staff have recently been substantially reduced in size as part of a general Operations Directorate Headquarters' reduction. We are taking a continuing close look, however, at the Staff's ability to meet its national FCI production responsibilities, which may be increased under E.O. 12036. We will be prepared to make such resource adjustments as experience may indicate necessary.
- o Recent reductions have been made in the CI Staff operational elements responsible for support of CIA FCI operations and for FCI coordination. We are also taking a continuing close look at the effect of this and will be prepared to make appropriate resource adjustments.

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V. Recapitulation

- o The foreign intelligence threat from the Soviet and Bloc intelligence services is worldwide, has no evident resource constraints, and has the United States as its first priority. It emphasizes military, political and S&T targeting. The Soviets have long outmatched us in numbers of intelligence officers.

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- o The extent to which our capabilities meet United States FCI needs should be determined by a not national FCI assessment encompassing the total threat. This should be a first priority so that our SCC/CI actions can be well based.

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DCI/CIA APPROACH TO FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI)-AN OVERVIEW

I. Hostile Foreign Intelligence Threat Facing the United States Abroad

- o Soviet and supporting Bloc intelligence personnel (involving some 23 intelligence and security services abroad in all) continue to have the United States as their principal intelligence target.
 - The USSR program is the largest, most active and most vigorous in conducting operations against United States citizens and interests around the world.
- o Soviet HUMINT resources are part of an integrated effort involving also SIGINT and Imagery. The SIGINT and Imagery threat is as significant as the HUMINT threat. These technical threats and their counter-measures are too complex, however, to be included in this brief overview and are not now part of our FCI program. They do have a direct bearing on our coping with the entire problem.
- o The Soviet HUMINT collection effort does not appear to be subject to resource and official cover restraints abroad.



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- o There is a Soviet and/or Bloc intelligence presence under official cover in some 114 countries. In each of these countries, KGB and GRU officers are assigned to the embassies and trade representations as well as to non-diplomatic installations such as press, airline and shipping offices.
 - Latin America, especially Mexico and Canada are particularly important bases for operations against the United States. The Soviets use both as staging grounds for dispatching illegals into the United States and as secure area for meeting their agents who are operating in the United States.

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- o Americans, NATO country citizens and other similar targets of Communist intelligence services often tend to be more relaxed and susceptible to recruitment in third countries.
- o Soviet and Bloc intelligence targeting worldwide, while continuing to seek penetrations in the United States military, foreign policy and intelligence establishments, also emphasizes scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence acquisition to fill in the gaps of a very large scale overt S&T collection effort.
- o Intermittent roll-ups of well-placed Soviet and/or Bloc agents abroad, such as recent cases in France, Canada and Iran indicate the continuing ability of the Communist Bloc services to achieve successful penetrations, especially in some of the NATO countries.

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II. DCI FCI Responsibilities

A. Community Responsibilities

- o DCI has budgetary responsibility for the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), including the FCI resources of all agencies engaged in FCI activities.
 - DCI reviews and approves the FCI components of the NFIP budget for submission to the President through the Office of Management and Budget.
- o DCI looks to the Special Coordination Committee/Counter intelligence (SCC/CI) for FCI policy guidance affecting administration of his NFIP responsibility.
 - E.O. 12036 assigns FCI policy responsibility to SCC/CI but resource management responsibility is not included.
- o DCI uses the staff of his Deputy for Resource Management to do Community FCI studies and assessments to promote FCI program effectiveness and review and evaluate NFIP budgets.

B. CIA Responsibilities

- o Conduct FCI activities outside the United States and coordinate FCI activities conducted outside the United States by other agencies within the Intelligence Community-- primarily the military FCI agencies, but also the FBI.
 - CIA field stations abroad do both. Final FCI coordination is at Headquarters by the CI Staff in the Operations Directorate.

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
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- o Maintain as a service of common concern centralized indexes and repositories of FCI information on foreign intelligence and security agencies with respect to their organization, personnel and functioning (assigned by National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID 5 and DCID 5/3).)
 - Although not explicitly so limited the central files and indices are concentrated on activities abroad and do not include equivalent detail on foreign intelligence and security service personnel and activities within the United States; principal holdings on that are by the FBI.
 - These central FCI files and indexes constitute a key part of the central files and indexes of the CIA Operations Directorate.

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


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- o
- o The extent to which our capabilities meet United States FCI needs should be determined by a net national FCI assessment encompassing the total threat. This should be a first priority so that our SCC/CI actions can be well based. The DCI through the Resource Management Staff, is prepared to take the lead in this effort if so directed.

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